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The PSA Early Career Network is holding a day’s conference in Manchester on Demystifying and Navigating Early Career Academia. It is a day of workshops and panels aimed at lifting the lid on academic processes – including advice on CVs and interviews, REF and TEF, and impact. Central to all sessions will be an attention to issues of equality and diversity and how to make academia more inclusive, including a panel on diversity in early academia.
It is a free event and travel bursaries will be available for those who need them. More details and registration can be found here:
PSA Women and Politics member Manjeet Ramgotra (SOAS) explores why the outcomes of the UK referendum and US elections were so close and the implications of this for democracy and liberal values.
The year 2016 has changed the political landscapes of Europe and the United States of America. The United Kingdom rejected its longstanding membership in the European Union and Americans elected an inexperienced ruler. The presidential election was determined by the electoral colleges’ proportional vote; however, the popular vote gave Hillary Clinton a slight majority. Why did these votes approximate a near 50-50 division? And what does this mean for democratic procedures?
In short, racial, gender, economic and social inequalities are key reasons for the results of these two votes. We tend to associate racist and sexist attitudes with uneducated, low-income working class people; yet middle class educated ‘white’ male and female Americans along with some Asians and ethnic minorities voted for Trump and some educated well-off British people of all ethnicities voted to leave Europe. Many find it difficult to fathom and resolve that these attitudes are not only those of uneducated low-income classes, but that they are prevalent amongst the educated middle classes.
As women and people of colour have become more educated, their positions in society have improved; nevertheless, there has been backlash from those who normally occupy this ground. Opposition to affirmative action programmes, a sense of entitlement and the view that women and people of colour do not hold as much authority as white men underpin disgruntled attitudes to racial and gender equality. These changing norms that promote equality were established only after much resistance and struggle. Yet they have not been fully accepted and remain controversial.
The near equal split in how people voted reflects division and tension not only within classes, but also between low-income working and middle classes. There has been much frustration amongst the middle classes with growing costs of living and static incomes resulting in a decrease in overall household income, while there has been a significant increase in the incomes of the highest earning segments of British and American populations. Middle-class positions have not improved, but have moved downwards. Moreover, their incomes finance public services and deficits. Trump’s promise to cut taxes and the idea that money spent on EU membership would be redirected towards much neglected public services translate into an alleviation of middle-class tax burden. Although lower taxes benefit middle-income classes who can no longer afford to fund public services, these policies disadvantage low-income classes. Working and low-income classes have borne the burdens of austerity, of massive cuts to benefits systems that used to allow people to live with adequate resources for food, housing and clothing. These cuts were justified through government and media campaigns that promoted the idea that many people on benefits are undeserving, lazy or cheats. However, austerity has made the most vulnerable worse off. For both middle and working classes, low wages coupled with job insecurity have diminished future prospects and stability. These classes are played off one another whilst those in the top 1% income brackets maintain their standing, privileges and wealth.
In both the US and UK, the political elites are increasingly accountable to the rich few who finance political parties and elections. Alignment between business and political elites disempowers the ‘people’ and places the voice of the electorate at a lower level of priority, unless needed to legitimate public policy. Political rulers are perceived as detached from their electorates, removed from everyday lives of ordinary people. There are some exceptions, Bernie Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn and Nicola Sturgeon who talk back to power. Although Trump promises to restore the position of the ordinary guy and Brexit presents an opportunity to regain control over decisions made in distant legislatures and global corporate offices, the situations of middle- and low-income classes will not change significantly. In all likelihood, they will get worse off. Frustration as well as potential friction between these social classes will continue, while those at the top prosper and rule and the climate gets precariously warmer, wars rage on, destitute migrants and refugees are denied dignity and compassion.
Trump and Brexit are the results of a dysfunctional system in which the choice between either maintaining structures or radical change does not present any real solution. These outcomes represent our ambivalence and uncertainty about how to reform political and economic structures to create an economy not based on material gain and exploitation (of people and the environment), but one that might promote equality and a decent life.
The very close vote in the UK and the differing outcomes of the majority and proportional votes in the presidential elections strike the heart of democratic methods. Democracy is a procedure for making decisions and determining who should rule. In order for decisions to be considered legitimate, we require consensus on these ground rules. Frequently, majority voting is considered a fair way to decide. However the problem with majority voting is that the decision can be unsound and it binds those who voted against it. The voice of the minority gets neglected, even suppressed by the tyranny of the majority. Proportional voting is meant to overcome these defects, to produce fair outcomes that do not ignore minority wishes. In the US, however, the proportional vote opposed the majority vote. In the UK and US, many do not readily accept these close results, which they contest and resist.
Even though in Britain the people have decided and have expressed their will, the referendum did not obtain a sufficient majority to fully legitimate such fundamental change. There is a substantial minority who do not agree that leaving Europe is in Britain’s best interests. These people are worried and frustrated that their voice does not count for much. There is a deep rift between the two halves of the electorate. The British have little idea on what exactly leaving the EU means and even less on how to reconstruct the British state especially as parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law are put into question. The High Court decision that the referendum was advisory, not binding and requires an act of parliament to legitimise it has resulted in a debate as to who has sovereignty, the bare majority of the people or parliament. The very concept and unity of the United Kingdom has been called into question. Scotland may secede and the UK-Irish border may again become contentious.
In the US, the proportional vote through electoral colleges has carried the day, but there remains much discontent amongst the majority population who did not vote for a leader who flaunted his authoritarian understanding of power during the electoral campaign. The two voting procedures do not reinforce each other but clash. Americans risk losing the values of equal respect, freedom and toleration that they fought to obtain and on which their liberalism is constructed. Gender, racial, economic and social inequalities are exacerbated and potentially volatile, especially under a new ruler whose public statements inflame these.
The dysfunction of our democratic structures has come to the fore in these awkward referendum and election results. We no longer agree on the foundations on which democracy is built. We are debating the ground rules, the procedures according to which we as a people make decisions and elect rulers. Our consensus on these rules that legitimate our political structures and institutions is crumbling. Many are afraid for we risk losing our democratic system and liberal values.
Manjeet Ramgotra is Senior Teaching Fellow at SOAS.
Amidst the recriminations and collective shock in the face of Trump’s victory (and the myriad other reverses suffered by progressives in 2016), a consensus is emerging: the weakness of the left is attributable to its embrace of “identity politics”. Rather than focussing on the interests and priorities of the majority, the story goes, the left has for too long embraced a simplistic and sectional politics in which the interests of racial and sexual minorities have taken centre stage, at the expense popularity and electability.
A recent outburst from the perhaps unlikely figure of Stephen Kinnock typifies this narrative. “What we need to see in the progressive Left”, argued Kinnock, “is an end to this identity politics”. In its place “we need to be talking far more about commonality rather than what differentiates from each other – let’s talk about what unites us.” Similar pronouncements have recently been made by Bernie Sanders, as well as a number of left-liberal commentators on both sides of the Atlantic. However, this unease about so-called “identity politics” has been a longstanding feature of left commentary and scholarship. In 1996 the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm lamented the corrosive effects of identity politics within the left,[ii] while more recently, a number of prominent radical left theorists – Slavoj Žižek, Alain Badiou and Jodi Dean, among others – cheered the resurgence of discussion of the idea of communism in the aftermath of the 2008 crash, in part because, for them, it marked the end of a divisive, deradicalised left in thrall to identity politics. This disdain for identity politics is not isolated to a few individuals: it is a widespread sensibility expressed by Marxists and left-liberals alike (indeed, there is probably not much else that Kinnock and Žižek would agree on).
But what, precisely, is this “identity politics” that inspires such animosity? At a basic level, “identity politics” refers to any politics that seeks to represent and/or advance the claims of a particular social group. But in the narratives outlined above, it has a more specific meaning: in left circles, “identity politics” is, as Nancy Fraser pointed out back in 1998, used largely as a derogatory term for feminism, anti-racism and anti-heterosexism. The implication was – and very often still is – that gender, race and sexuality are identity-based in the sense that they are seen as flimsy, superficial and, to use Judith Butler’s memorable phrase, ‘merely cultural’. This, of course, is to be contrasted with its constitutive outside, class. Class relations, in the eyes of the identity politics critic, exhibit a depth, profundity and materiality that ‘mere identity’ lacks. Furthermore, the alleged universalism of class is contrasted with the narrow, sectional concerns characteristic of so-called identity politics.
But what, precisely, is wrong with this framing of the problem? For one, the implied distinction between “identity” (read: narrow, shallow, self-interested) and “class” politics (read: broad, deep, universal, authentic) misconstrues the character of these different strands of progressive politics, in at least three ways. First, all forms of politics arguably involve some kind of appeal an identity, insofar as, to use the language of political theorist Michael Saward, they entail claims to speak for a politically salient constituency (and thus an “identity” of sorts). This applies as much to “class” as any other dimension of power and identity. Indeed, as Gurminder Bhambra has argued in a recent piece for The Sociological Review, these appeals to “class” are quintessential identity politics: they appeal to an identity category – the (presumed white) working class – whose interests have been shamefully neglected by elitist, out of touch leftists and liberals. The question is not, therefore, universalism or identitarianism, but whether or not we acknowledge the “identitarian” character of our political claims. Something akin to this is eloquently described by James Clifford in a 1999 essay entitled ‘Taking Identity Politics Seriously’, where he argues that ‘opposition to the special claims of racial or ethnic minorities often masks another, unmarked ‘identity politics’, an actively sustained historical positioning and possessive investment in Whiteness’.[iv]
Second, few contemporary feminists or anti-racists would adopt the “identitarian” view that one’s identity necessarily gives rise to specific forms of politics. Indeed, the recent history of feminism, queer politics and anti-racism is precisely one of problematising identity by analysing and challenging the various ways in which heteronormativity, capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy shape identity-formation (recent work by Jasbir Puar, Sam Chambers, Imogen Tyler, Patricia Hill Collins and Alison Phipps spring to mind as exemplars). Ironically, Marxism arguably comes closer to the popular stereotype of reductive identity politics, insofar as it holds that one’s position within capitalist relations of production – and the forms of consciousness and identity this gives rise to – conditions one’s political interests.
Third, a frankly bewildering inference made by Kinnock, Žižek et al is that the left in its various guises has spent its time of late doggedly pursuing the interests of women, sexual minorities and racial minorities. The reality, however, is that left-wing movements and political parties in the UK and US have an at best patchy track records on race, gender and sexuality, as recent scholarship by the likes of Janet Conway, Julia Downes, Lara Coleman and Abigail Bakan make clear. All the way from the moderate liberal left to the radical Marxist left, race, gender and sexuality continue to be cast as minority concerns at best, and “bourgeois distractions” at worst, while sexism and misogyny (including, but not limited to, the sexual abuse of women comrades) remain depressingly prevalent across a variety of left spaces.[v]
Consequently, left-wing denunciations of identity politics yield a number of alarming consequences: they naturalise gendered and racialised hierarchies by casting white, male class politics as universal. Such a narrative is therefore not only powerless to challenge, but actively complicit in, the re-energised white supremacism which, as Akwugo Emejulu has recently outlined,[vi] has been fundamental to the context of Trump’s victory. What is more, to pit class politics against identity politics casts women, racial minorities and sexual minorities as outside the boundaries of true, authentic “working classness”. As such, the political claims of working class ethnic minorities, queers and women increasingly go unheard. This is exacerbated by the continued use of “left behind” as euphemism for “white working class”, with its inference that white poverty is unnatural, exceptional, worthy of our attention, while black poverty is either invisible or simply part of the natural order of things. Who is seen to “count” as authentically working class has thus become a key terrain of struggle in the era of Trump and Brexit.
Let us, therefore, not be under any illusions about how these dismissals of “identity politics” function: they are, in effect, a kind of dog whistle to those on the left who might, for instance, agree that black lives matter, but ultimately believe that when push comes to shove it is the (white male) working class that matters more. As others have pointed out,[vii] this is tantamount to being called upon to sacrifice a range of constituencies – women, racial minorities, queers, immigrants (and at times perhaps also trans people, non-binary and gender non-conforming folk, sex workers) – on the altar of political expediency. Putting aside any doubts as to whether this would actually work in terms of galvanising electoral support, this is clearly a morally bankrupt form of politics.
On a (slightly) more positive note, I am clearly not the only one to find class for a “return to class” alarming: indeed, since I started writing this piece a number of comment pieces have appeared online advancing a similar argument[viii] I would also concede that the challenges facing those committed to a progressive politics are deep and complicated, and I do not for a second claim to have solution. But any solution that insists we forget, minimise or ignore the disadvantage of those who are not white and male is not one I want to sign up to.
Jonathan Dean is Lecturer in Politics in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds.
[ii] Hobsbawm, E. (1996) ‘Identity politics and the Left’. New Left Review 217: 38–47.
[iv] See Clifford, J. (1999) ‘Taking Identity Politics Seriously: The Contradictory, Stony Ground’. In: P. Gilroy, L. Grossberg and A. McRobbie (eds.) Without Guarantees: Essays in Honour of Stuart Hall. London: Verso.
[v] See, for example, this piece by Julia Downes on sexual violence in activist communities: https://www.opendemocracy.net/transformation/julia-downes/salvaging-listening-to-sexual-violence-survivors-in-uk-activist-communit. Accessed 25/11/16.
[vi] See, for example, http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2934-the-centre-of-a-whirlwind-watching-whiteness-work and http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2733-on-the-hideous-whiteness-of-brexit-let-us-be-honest-about-our-past-and-our-present-if-we-truly-seek-to-dismantle-white-supremacy. Accessed 25/11/16.
[vii] See, for example, this twitter thread from @BreeNewsome: https://twitter.com/BreeNewsome/status/800725481775661056, or this article by Paul Mason: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/09/globalisation-dead-white-supremacy-trump-neoliberal. Both accessed 25/11/16.
[viii] Maya Goodfellow’s recent piece for The Staggers blog is particularly worth a read. See http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2016/11/white-working-class-another-form-identity-politics. Accessed 28/11/16.
[i] A number of the arguments contained here are articulated in more depth in Dean, J. (2015). ‘Radicalism Restored? Communism and the end of Left Melancholia’. Contemporary Political Theory 14(3): 234-255.
Dear Jack (can we call you Jack?),
Thanks so much for your unsupported musings article on the ridiculously wittily phrased ‘anti-bloke bias’ in academia. It is always rage-inducing refreshing to see a bloke mansplain explain privilege to wimmin.
Let’s start with the opening, Jack (can we call you Jack?)
To even ask the question risks raising the hackles of many who still see sexism as a huge problem faced by women in the academy…
Problematic canine metaphors aside (bitches, anyone?), consider our hackles raised, Jack.
Other, less woke, wimmin than ourselves might dismiss this opening claim, but once we saw the quality of your data, it gave us ‘paws’ for thought. We’d never thought about the silencing of men’s voices in academia. Consider, for example, the one (that’s right – one) ‘bloke’ that makes up your article’s empirical foundation, pulled with little contextual explanation from a wider study that’s actually looking at support for BME academics.
“Departments have some kind of fear of some men – that’s why I have been held back,” said the academic, quoted anonymously in the study.
This is groundbreaking investigative journalism, Jack (can we call you Jack?) – a much-needed and welcome corrective to the overwhelming evidence of established bias against women in academia (like, we don’t know, maybe all the stuff on women’s continuing under-representation in academic posts – especially women of colour, or journal citation bias, or gender bias in teaching evaluations – well-established patterns that you’ve actually written about).
As political scientists, we’re always interested in new and exciting methodologies – so we’ve replicated your approach of acquiring a single data point by engaging one woman in a ‘hushed conversation’ in a corridor (we can’t reveal any further information for ethical reasons, bound as we are to the standards of our field).
Turns out, we’ve all worked with that guy (or someone like him). We’ve seen with our own eyes former male colleagues fighting back against their own marginalization through brave acts of resistance – drawing penis pics on staff meeting agendas, groping or propositioning younger female colleagues (shout out to the woke dude who sent one of us a text from the audience at the PSA Conference last year while we were on a panel asking us for sex), or publicly expressing that women taking maternity leave were ‘entitled’ and unproductive. For those men that don’t have the political capital to take a direct stand, more indirect forms of resistance are available to you – through who you cite, who you hire, who you promote, and who you give administrative responsibilities to.
Fight the power, dudes, fight the power.
Yours in privilege,
Meryl Kenny & Elizabeth Evans
The PSA Women and Politics Specialist Group is delighted to announce the winners of our annual Undergraduate Essay Competition. This year’s judge, Professor Rosie Campbell (Birkbeck, University of London and Vice-Chair of the Political Studies Association) noted the high quality of this year’s essays, stating: ‘The submissions were again of an excellent standard with a range of topics covered from the study of women and war to maternity leave provision in UK higher education institutions. The two most outstanding essays both addressed issues of gender and globalisation.’
Our 2016 winners are:
First Prize – Sebastian Wigdel-Bowcott (University of Leeds): ‘Critically assess the implications of postcolonial theory for our understanding of contemporary feminist politics’
The judge said: ‘Sebastian’s essay (submitted by Dr Alexa Athelstan) combines a deep understanding of abstract theory with an excellent use of examples. It was well written and engaging. I particularly enjoyed the way he pulled in examples from contemporary feminist activism such as Femen’s ‘Topless Jihad’ campaign. These examples were analysed through the lens of feminist theorists such as Butler, Eisenstein and Chester. Overall, the essay is an exemplar of how to use examples to explore, critique and develop theoretical approaches to gender and politics.’
Read Sebastian’s essay here.
Second Prize – Pablo Pérez Ruiz (University of Edinburgh): ‘Is globalisation good for women?’
The judge said: ‘This essay (submitted by Dr. Claire Duncanson) is extremely well written and constructed and presents complex issues with nuance and insight. Pablo demonstrates that gender relations are central to economic globalisation and provides a thoughtful critique of approaches that fail to acknowledge the role of gender.’
Read Pablo’s essay here.
Congratulations Sebastian and Pablo!
By Karen Ross, Newcastle University
Sometimes it’s hard to be a woman (/feminist political communication scholar) because most of my time is spent on absences, peering into the black hole of women’s silencing. Any number of men, both politicians and journalists, regularly claim that this or that election will focus on the mumsnet vote or, in the case of the EU Referendum, that women voters will determine the outcome. The implication of these pontifications is that women will somehow be addressed as women, as if their/our concerns, interests and ballot box behaviour are both biologically-determined and homogenous. Not only is this fatuous nonsense, but even if it was a little bit true (for example, most of the folks who campaigned against the tampon tax were probably women), political parties and the media make scant effort to find out what women, individually or severally, might actually want. The siren song of ‘where are the women?’ has been heard as much during this campaign as any others although the final weeks of the campaign did see an improvement in the visibility of women politicians speaking on both sides of the argument.
The consideration of women’s ‘specialness’ was exemplified by both Remain and Leave’s launch of femme-campaigns, with Remain’s Women IN campaign launched in January via an open letter to the Evening Standard signed by 50 “leading businesswomen, scientists, trade union officials and health professionals.” Leave’s effort, Women for Britain, was somewhat cynically deployed on International Women’s Day, fronted by UKIP’s Suzanne Hill and Priti Patel for the Tories, with Patel subsequently becoming the only woman politician who enjoyed media traction in the first weeks of the campaign. Unfortunately for Patel, comparing herself and the other EU refuseniks with the Suffragettes’ struggle did not sit well with Emmeline Pankhurst’s great grand-daughter, Helen, who demanded an apology for the (in)appropriation. What unites both campaigns is the strange fact that their respective official launches constitute their only significant media appearance, not so much a campaign, more a PR stunt. There have been a few soundbites from their various spokespeople since their launches but they do not add up to a campaign for women’s votes: on polling day, Women for Britain’s FB page had a mere 1448 likes.
By May, the domination of a few male voices (Dave, Boz and Mike) and the extreme narrowness of the debate – it’s all about immigration, stupid – not to mention #allmalepanels, mansplaining and the beauty contest for next Tory Leader, was revealed in a Labour report discussed by Harriet Harman, prompting her to say that women were being “frozen out of the debate” and that she would be making an official complaint to Ofcom about women’s under-representation. Labour’s research showed that between January and the end of May, only 2 out of 14 commentators on BBC TV’s breakfast show were women as were 10 of the 58 politicians contributing to the Today programme alongside the 6 women out of 24 guests invited to chat on Good Morning Britain. This resonates exactly with Loughborough University Centre for Research in Communication and Culture’s rather excellent campaign coverage reports which persistently showed the marginalisation of women’s voices throughout the campaign.
By early June, the parties and the media seemed to have taken notice of the conspicuous and voluble social media critique of the exclusionary tenor of the tory-boys-story and ITV’s EU debate fielded five women and Boris. Remain had Angela Eagle (Lab), Amber Rudd (Cons) and Nicola Sturgeon (SNP) and Leave had Andrea Leadsom (Cons) and Gisela Stuart (Lab). The BBC followed suit in the last televised (The Great) debate on 21 June with the same pair of women for Leave but a different line-up for Remain (Ruth Davidson, Leader of the Scottish Conservatives and Frances O’Grady, General Secretary of the TUC) bookending Sadiq Khan. The media coverage of the event, at least the stories I read, was mostly gender-neutral with none of the routine trivialisation on women’s sartorial style. However, the Mail could not resist commenting on Davidson’s passion for kick-boxing and her recent engagement to her “partner Jennifer Wilson”, a level of personal detail not provided for any of the other panellists. Whilst the last week of the campaign did indeed render women more visible in terms of these set-piece debates, general coverage remained a boys’ own story, with Jo Cox the most significant woman politician in the media spotlight for all the wrong reasons. We now know that xenophobia won the day and her belief that we have more in common than divides us has failed to persuade. We are the poorer for that.
Reprinted with kind permission from Dan Jackson, Einar Thorsen and Dominic Wring, eds. (2016) EU Referendum Analysis: Media, Voters and the Campaign, first published on 4 July 2016. http://bit.ly/EUReferendumAnalysis2016_Jackson-Thorsen-and-Wring_v1
The W.J.M. Mackenzie Book Prize is awarded annually by the UK Political Studies Association to the best book published in political science in each calendar year.
Yet, until 2016, the prize has only ever been awarded to men.
[UPDATE: Congrats to Ruth Dixon, who in 2016, became the first female co-recipient of the MacKenzie Book Prize, along with Christopher Hood for their co-authored book A Government That Worked Better and Cost Less? Evaluating Three Decades of Reform and Change in UK Central Government. Read more here]
(Thanks to http://allmalepanels.tumblr.com for highlighting this).
Below we include a partial (crowd-sourced) list of excellent books written by women in politics and IR during the last thirty years that our members have recommended. Please send us your suggestions and additions – which books written by women political scientists, IR scholars and theorists have influenced you?
- Jane Mansbridge (1980) Beyond Adversary Democracy. New York: Basic Books.
- Susan Strange (1986) Casino Capitalism. Oxford University Press.
- Carole Pateman (1988) The Sexual Contract. Polity Press.
- Cynthia Enloe (1989) Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. University of California Press.
- Susan Moller Okin (1989) Justice, Gender and the Family. Basic Books.
- Iris Marion Young (1990) Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton University Press.
- Sylvia Walby (1990) Theorising Patriarchy. Blackwell.
- Cynthia Cockburn (1991) In The Way of Women. Macmillan.
- J. Ann Tickner (1992) Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. Columbia University Press.
- Joni Lovenduski and Vicky Randall (1993). Contemporary Feminist Politics: Women and Power in Britain. Oxford University Press.
- Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris (1993) Gender and Party Politics. London: Sage.
- Chantal Mouffe (1993) The Return of the Political. Verso.
- Liah Greenfeld (1993) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Harvard University Press.
- Diana Coole (1993) Women in Political Theory: From Ancient Misogyny to Contemporary Feminism. 2nd ed. Lynne Rienner.
- Anne Phillips (1995) The Politics of Presence: The Political Representation of Gender, Ethnicity, and Race. Oxford University Press.
- Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski (1995) Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament. Cambridge University Press.
- Jan Jindy Pettman (1996) Worlding Women: A Feminist International Politics. Routledge.
- Martha Finnemore (1996) National Interests in International Society. Cornell University Press.
- Ruth Lister (1997) Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Palgrave.
- Carol Lee Bacchi (1999) Women, Policy and Politics: The Construction of Policy Problems. Sage.
- Marysia Zalewski (2000) Feminism after Postmodernism: Theorising through Practice. Routledge.
- Carol Johnson (2000) Governing Change: Keating to Howard. University of Queensland Press.
- Gabriella Slomp (2000) Thomas Hobbes and the Political Philosophy of Glory, Macmillan.
- Ann Russo (2001) Taking Back Our Lives. Routledge.
- Christine Sylvester (2001) Feminist International Relations: An Unfinished Journey. Cambridge University Press.
- Maja Zehfuss (2002) Constructivism in International Relations. Cambridge University Press.
- Shirin Rai (2002) Gender and the Political Economy of Development: From Nationalism to Globalisation. Polity.
- Louise Chappell (2002) Gendering Government. UBC Press.
- Pippa Norris (2003) Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. Cambridge University Press.
- Michele Micheletti (2003) Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism and Collective Action. Palgrave.
- Sarah Childs (2004) New Labour’s Women MPs: Women Representing Women. Routledge.
- Joni Lovenduski (2005) Feminizing Politics. Polity Press.
- Miki Caul Kittilson (2006) Challenging Parties, Changing Parliaments: Women and Elected Office in Contemporary Western Europe. The Ohio State University Press.
- Georgina Waylen (2007) Engendering Transitions: Women’s Mobilisation, Institutions and Gender Outcomes. Oxford University Press.
- Valerie Bryson (2007) Gender and the Politics of Time: Feminist Theory and Contemporary Debates. Policy Press.
- Ayesha Siddiqa (2007) Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. Pluto Press.
- Judith Squires (2007) The New Politics of Gender Equality. Palgrave.
- Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry (2007) Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics. Zed Books.
- Bonnie Meguid (2008) Party Competition Between Unequals: Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge University Press.
- Kimberly Hutchings (2008) Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present. MUP.
- Christina Boswell (2009/2012) The Political Uses of Expert Knowledge: Immigration Policy and Social Research. Cambridge University Press.
- Nancy Fraser (2010) Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalising World. Columbia University Press.
- Mona Lena Krook and Fiona Mackay (2011) Gender, Politics and Institutions: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism. Palgrave.
- Fidelma Ashe (2011) The New Politics of Masculinity: Men, Power and Resistance. Routledge.
- Jacqui True (2012) The Political Economy of Violence Against Women. Oxford University Press.
- Marysia Zalewski (2013) Feminist International Relations: Exquisite Corpse. Routledge.
- Charli Carpenter (2014) ‘Lost’ Causes: Agenda Vetting in Global Issue Networks and the Shaping of Human Security. Cornell University Press.
- Louise Chappell (2015) The Politics of Gender Justice at the International Criminal Court. Oxford University Press.